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Wolfe: Civil Rights - The Status of Official and Municipal Immunity from
CIVIL RIGHTS-The status of official and municipal immunity from damage
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services
of the City of New York, 436 U.S.-., 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d. 611

(1978).

In 1971 female employees of the New York City Board
of Education and the New York City Department of Social
Services brought a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970).1 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
agency policies that forced pregnant employees to take an
unpaid leave of absence prior to the time required by medical
reasons. The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for
the periods of unlawful forced leave. The District Court for
the Southern District of New York concluded that enforcement of the policies was unconstitutional2 under Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur3 , but held moot plaintiff's
claim for injunctive relief since the defendant agencies had
changed their maternity leave policies. The court also denied
plaintiff's prayers for back pay because of the immunity conferred upon municipalities by Monroe v. Pape.4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.'
The court held that the Board of Education was not a person
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because "it performs a vital governmental function." 6 The court recognized that the individual
defendants, even when sued in their official capacities, were
persons under Section 1983 but it denied jurisdiction over
these officials because any damage award would "have to be
paid by a city that was held not to be amenable to such action in Monroe v. Pape."I
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider:
Whether local governmental officials and/or local independent school boards are "persons" within the
Copyright©1979 by the University of Wyoming
1. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. Monell v. Department of Social Service of the City of New York, 394 F. Supp. 853
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
3. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). This case held that
maternity leave policies that forced pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves prior
to the time required for medical reasons were unconstitutional.
4. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
5. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Ser. of the City of N.Y., 532 F. 2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
6. Id. at 263.
7. Id at 265.
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meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief in
the nature of back pay is sought against them in
their official capacities?8
In a surprising reversal, the court abandoned seventeen
years of precedent and overruled Monroe9 , "insofar as it
holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit
under Section 1983. ' '10 The court, in a seven to two decision,
undertook a fresh analysis of the debates on the Civil Rights
2 that ConAct of 1871.11 It decided, contrary to Monroe,"
gress had intended to include municipalities within the ambit of the "person" liable under what is now 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 1 In striking down municipal immunity, Monell resolved one of the major difficulties facing Section 1983 litigants,
however, the court purposefully left unaddressed the "full
contours of municipal liability."' The court held that municipalities could not be liable on a respondeat superior theory
of vicarious liability 15 but beyond that limitation the court
would not venture. This note will examine briefly the effect
of Monell upon official immunity. It will then consider the
issues of where the lines of municipal liability should be
drawn, and whether a residual municipal immunity has survived.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION

1983

The elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
are: (1) that the conduct complained of was engaged in under
color of state law, and (2) that such conduct deprived the
plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Federal Constitution and laws.16 It is important to note that
the type of action that is brought under Section 1983 determines which of the elements will be the central issue in the
litigation. In Wyoming and the Tenth Circuit the bulk of
cases under Section 1983 have been suits against school
boards alleging impermissible firing of teachers or disciplin8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Ser. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S.
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Monell].

__,

98 S.Ct. 2018, 2021

Monroe v. Pape, supra note 4.
Monell. supra note 8. at 2022.
Id. at 2023.
Monroe v. Pape. supra note 4.
Monell. supra note 8. at 2035.
Monell. supra note 8, at 2041.
Id. at 2036.
Jones v. Hooper. 410 F. 2d 1323. 1326 (10th Cir. 1969). Cert. denied 397 U.S. 991
(1970).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/11

2

Wolfe: Civil Rights - The Status of Official and Municipal Immunity from

1979

CASE NOTES

283

ing of students. In these cases it is conceded that the school
boards are acting under color of state law, so the cases are
decided solely on the issue of whether a protected right has
been violated. 17 The main immunity question in these cases
is the presence of a qualified privilege for the responsible officials.
In other Section 1983 actions, especially cases involving
police officers, prison officials, or bureaucratic decisions the
central issue is whether the official was acting under color of
state law or on his own initiative in excess of established
limits.'8 These cases raise the question of the extent to which
municipalities are immune for the acts of their officials.
STATUS OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY IN WYOMING

It is doubtful that Monell affects the present status of
official immunity in Wyoming. It could be argued that
because officials have historically derived their immunity
from the municipalities that employ them, Monell, by
destroying the municipal immunity also strips away the official privilege.'" However, this argument has little support
because the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a separate
standard for official immunity, independent of municipal immunity.
0 , the
Since the seminal civil rights decision of Monroe"
courts have held individuals liable under Section 1983 for actions taken in their official capacity. But this liability has
always been read against the interpretation that the
Reconstruction Congress did not intend in enacting Section
1983 "to abolish wholesale all common law immunities. "21
The Supreme Court has held that an immunity exists to the
extent historically accorded by the common law to the official.22 The immunity is absolute for legislators,23 judges,"4
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See, Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1,Albany County, Wyo., 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir.
1975); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973).
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (police officers); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
362 98 S.Ct. 855 (1978) (prison officials).
Minge, Governmental Immunity From Damages Actions in Wyoming, 7 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 229, 242 (1972).
Monroe v. Pape, supra note 4.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976).
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Pierson v. Ray, supra note 21.
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and prosecutors,"5 but is only qualified for all other executive
officers."
In a post-Monell case the Wyoming Supreme Court has
outlined the scope of the qualified official privilege. In Board
of Trustees of Weston County School DistrictNo. 1 v. Holso
the court affirmed a district court ruling reinstating the
teacher plaintiff and granting damages and attorneys fees
against the superintendent under Section 1983.27 The court
analyzed the superintendent's privilege under the qualified,
good faith immunity standard announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland.8 The Wyoming court
held that in order to be entitled to the immunity, the defendant:
Must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) that he acted without malicious intention to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional
rights or cause him to suffer other injury, and (2)
that he did not know and reasonably need not have
known that his conduct violated the constitutional
rights of the party affected. 9
The court found for the plaintiff by showing that actual
malice existed and that the defendant "knew or should have
known, that the action he took would cause a deprivation of
plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy." 3 The Wood v.
Strickland3 test has been adopted by the Tenth Circuit 32 and

it has been given additional support by two recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases, Butz v. Economou holding federal executive officers to a qualified immunity, 3 and Procunier
v.
3
Navarette holding prison officials to the same standard. 4
Holso 35 makes it clear that the official immunity doc-

trine is unaffected by Monell. The Wyoming court recognized Monell but did not discuss the case because there was
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Imbler v. Pachtman, supra note 22.
See list Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1978).
Board of Trustees of Weston Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Holso; Alberta v. Holso, __
P.2d __, (Wyo. 1978) (No. 4807 and 4808 decided August 28, 1978).
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
Board of Trustees of Weston Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Holso, supra note 27, at 14.
Id. at 14.
Wood v. Strickland, supra note 28.
Bertot v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,Albany County, Wyo., supra note 17.
Butz v. Economou, U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978).
Procunier v. Navarette, supra note 18.
Board of Trustees of Weston Cty. Schl. Dist. No. 1 v. Holso, supra note 27.
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no concern about the board of trustee's liability. In summary, the Wyoming court has set a standard for official privilege that is independent of the Monell abrogation of municipal immunity.
THE LIMITS OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY AFTER MONELL

The scope of municipal liablity under Section 1983 after
Monell is difficult to determine. The court, by not addressing
the issue, has left to the lower courts the job of evolving an
appropriate standard. The only definite limit that the court
sets is a determination that a municipality should not be
held liable under the respondeat superior theory solely because it employed a tortfeasor3 8 The court reached this
conclusion by an analysis of the legislative history behind
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1 The rationale for the respondeatsuperiordoctrine was analyzed by
the Monell court and it was not persuaded that the doctrine
would accomplish its stated purposes of reducing accidents
and spreading the risk of injury among all citizens.3 8
The respondeatsuperiorlimitation is of little usefulness
in the attempt to determine exactly the types of activities
for which a municipality should be liable. The weakness of
the respondeat superior limit is that all actions of a
municipality can only be performed through its agents, and
thus all municipal liability is in a sense vicarious. 9 The court
"by rejecting vicarious liability . . . had rejected one end

point on the spectrum of responsibilities that might be cast
on state and local governments, but it has not indicated
what lesser responsibility should be expected." 4
To determine what municipalities can expect to be held
liable for, it is essential to look at the language of the court in
Monell. The language that the lower courts will probably
focus upon is Justice Brennan's statement that:
36. Monell. supra note 8, at 2047 (J. Powell, concurring).
37. Id at 2036.
38. Id at 2037-2038.
39. Adekalu v. N.Y. City. 431 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
40. Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J., 1483, 1541
1977).
This excellent article was cited by the Monell court. Monell, supra note 8, at 2044 J.
Powell, concurring).
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Local government bodies can be sued ...where...

the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements, or executes a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.
They may also be sued for "constitutional deprivations
visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such
custom has not received formal approval
through the body's
42
official decision making channels.

In analyzing this language the question the lower courts
must address is exactly what elements constitute the cause
of action against a municipality. One district court prior to
Monell concluded that there should be liability where "a pattern or practice of unconstitutional activity... may fairly be
found to result from policies or actions of persons holding
such high municipal office that they can reasonably be held
to reflect municipal policy."
The broad language of the Monell court and the reasoning in Adekalu v. New York City44 have been echoed in two
post-Monell court of appeals decisions. In both cases
policemen markedly exceeded their authority, and the courts
had little difficulty finding the municipality not liable.45
These cases are easy for the courts as are cases such as
Monell where a clearly unconstitutional policy has been enforced. The courts will have much greater difficulty
elucidating an appropriate standard for those cases where
constitutionally questionable policies or practices are combined with officials who may be exceeding their stated
authority. These cases will involve questions of the
municipality's duty to supervise employees and the specificity with which grants of authority are given to these officials.
The Supreme Court has given some indication of how it
will treat such cases by its decision in Rizzo v. Goode. 6
Despite District Court findings that a number of citizens
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Monell, supra note 8, at 2035-2036.
Id at 2036.
Adekalu v. N.Y. City, supra note 39.
Id. at 813.
Reimer v. Short, 578 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1978); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846
(9th Cir. 1978).
Rizzo v. Goode, supra note 18.
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had their civil rights violated by the Philadelphia police
department the Court rejected the lower court decree ordering changes in the city's police department. The Court found
that the infringements had not been fostered by high level
officials and declined to attribute the actions of the police officers to the city government. Rizzo v. Goode was cited by
the Monell court in support of the proposition that "the mere
right to control without any control or direction having been
exercised and without and failure to supervise is not enough
to support Section 1983 liability.

' 47

Rizzo v. Goode repre-

sents a more difficult factual situation than Monell but the
result seems to fit the Monell language of a need to show
that the acts resulted from an "official policy of some
nature."

4

The appropriate standard for finding a municipality
liable should evolve from a flexible interpretation of the
broad Monell language of what constitutes a "policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by that body's officers.

'4

The plaintiff

should not have to show a consistent, pervasive pattern of
officially sanctioned constitutional violations." However,
there must be more than just an isolated incident. A cause of
action based on excessive delegation of authority or
negligent supervision should succeed if the plaintiff can
show governmental "custom''" or an "official policy of some

nature."52 The facts will control the analysis and the courts
must investigate closely the relationship between the official's actions and the policies that this action seeks to implement.
A

RESIDUAL IMMUNITY AFTER MONELL

In Monell Justice Brennan reserved the question of
whether there is some form of municipal immunity remain47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

MonelI, supra note 8, at 2037 n. 58.
Id at 2036.
Id at 2036.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 n. 14 (1977). Consistent pattern of official racial discrimination not necessary
predicate to violation of equal protection clause.
Monel, supra note 8, at 2036.
It should be noted that the Congress is currently considering the Civil Rights Improvement Act of 1977. The act embodies the Monell result and sets standards for
the imposition of governmental liability. See, S. 35, 95th Congress. 1st Sess., 123
Cong. Rec. S205 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977). Section 2(c)(1) of the bill would make state
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ing.11 Justice Powell hints that an immunity may still exist,
presumably based in common law. He suggests the possibility that a qualifed immunity "may remove some of the harshness of liability for good faith failure to predict the uncertain
course of constitutional adjudication." 4 The theories that
support municipal immunity have been much criticized, and
the recent trend has been to severely restrict or abolish all
immunities. Wyoming is the most recent state to abrogate
municipal immunity. In Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of CarbonCounty, the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that municipalities will have to defend as ordinary persons."
In the face of decisions such as Oroz and the overwhelming
trend toward expanding municipal liability, it is difficult to
determine what residual immunity survives after Monell.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the question of a limited municipal immunity because, until Monell,
municipalities were absolutely immune under Monroe v.
Pape.6 6 In contrast to the doctrine of official immunity,
which has been developed in decisions spanning three
decades, 7 there is no body of Supreme Court precedent that
outlines a qualified good faith municipal privilege. In trying
to define an appropriate standard of municipal immunity the
courts could look to state law. However, this approach would
seem to undermine the basic premise of Section 1983, which
is to create a federal cause of action to redress civil rights
violations. 8 By deferring to state law the rights of Section
1983 litigants would be subjected to the peculiarities of each
state's position on governmental immunities, and identical
causes of action in two different states may receive vastly
different treatment.
The lower courts could also try to use the language of
Justice Powell's footnote as the basis for a standard and confer immunity "for good faith failure to predict the uncertain

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

and local governments liable if their responsible officials "directed, authorized, approved or encouraged" subordinates to infringe federal rights or if they failed to
take action against "a pervasive pattern of unconstitutional or unlawful conduct"
among subordinates. Id. § 2(c)(1).
Monell. supra note 8. at 2041.
Id. at 2047 n. 9 (J. Powell concurring).
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155. (Wyo.
1978).
Monroe v. Pape, supru note 4.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW. § 26.00 - 26.00-4 ISupp. 1976).
Monroe v. Pape. supra note 4.
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course of constitutional adjudication." 69 It would seem,
however, that such a standard should have been applicable
to the Monell facts. In Monell the school board issued their
maternity leave policies in conformance with what was then
established law. The suit was brought in 1971 and the
policies were changed in 1971-72.60 It was not until 1974, in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur1 , that such
pregnancy leave policies were declared unconstitutional. Applying the Justice Powell standard it could be argued that
the Moneil board should have had a qualified immunity.
However, in 1978, the court held the board liable for back
pay. In light of the Moneil facts and its holding, Justice
Powell's footnote does not provide the lower courts with any
clear guidance on the residual immunity issue.
The Monell holding seems contradictory. The court
abolishes absolute immunity yet it holds out a hope that this
new liability will be tempered with a qualified immunity. The
difficulty arises because the court has set no standard test
for this qualified privilege. There are sound policy reasons
for having a good faith official immunity. As the Supreme
Court said in Scheuer v. Rhodes:
Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity ... absolute or qualified... for their acts, is

a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it
is better to risk some error and possible injury from
such error than not to decide or act at all. 2
The rationale supporting a qualified municipal immunity is
based on discredited common law history, and had been subject to a great deal of criticism.63 The fact that at least 354
jurisdictions, including Wyoming, have abolished municipal
immunity argues strongly against the Supreme Court
establishing a municipal immunity for Section 1983 actions.
A better approach would be for the Supreme Court to state
at its first opportunity that no municipal immunity survives. If the court wishes some form of immunity to exist it
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Monell, supra note 8, at 2047 n. 9 J. Powell, concurring).
Monell, supra note 2.
Cleveland Board of Ed. v. LaFleur, supra note 3.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-242 (1974).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 57, at § 25.00 (Supp. 1970).
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, supra note 55, at 1157.
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must define the appropriate standard so as to provide some
guidance to the lower courts.
CONCLUSION

Monell is a dramatic step towards increasing the accessibility of the courts to Section 1983 litigants. By Overruling Monroe 85 and abolishing municipal immunity Monell
removes stumbling blocks that have stymied civil rights actions. By eliminating artificial procedural barriers and the
fictional inquiry into the "person status", Monell says that
Section 1983 actions should be tried on their merits.
Monell does not appear to affect the status of a qualified
official immunity but it does leave unclear the extent of
liability that the Court intends for municipalities to assume.
On the basis of the Monell language, a lower court determining municipal liability will have to make a detailed inquiry
into the relationship between an official's actions and the
policies that motivate that action.
The Supreme Court leaves unaddressed the question of
whether a good faith immunity for municipalities should still
exist. In the face of the rejection by the majority of jurisdictions of municipal immunity the Court should avoid creating
a good faith municipal immunity standard for Section 1983
actions. The Court should act promptly to dispel the idea
that municipalities enjoy a qualified good faith privilege or
at least provide some guidance to the lower courts as to the
appropriate standard.
LAWRENCE J. WOLFE

65.

Monroe v. Pape. supra note 4.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/11

10

